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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On January 22, 2007, the Supreme Court decided the consolidated 
cases of Jones v. Bock,1 Williams v. Overton,2 and Walton v. Bouchard,3 
all of which were Sixth Circuit cases. In a unanimous decision,4 the 
Supreme Court clarified what constitutes exhaustion of prison 
grievance procedures under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(PLRA).5 The Court also offered its view on the correct way to 
balance the burden between prisoner plaintiffs and the judiciary, 
which labors to process prisoner complaints.6 Broken into three 
discreet issues, the essential holding provides a small victory for 
prison litigants. First, it established that a prisoner litigating under the 
PLRA does not have the burden to plead and demonstrate 
exhaustion in the complaint. Rather, the defendant must raise lack of 
exhaustion as an affirmative defense.7 Second, it addressed whether a 
prisoner’s initial administrative grievance must identify and name all 
the individuals charged in its complaint.8 This determination lowered 
the bar outlined by the Sixth Circuit. Finally, it reviewed whether the 
PLRA requires dismissal of an entire complaint when some, but not 
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all of the claims asserted have been exhausted. Once again, this issue 
was decided in favor of prisoners’ rights.9 
II.  RELEVANT LAW: THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995 
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a prisoner has the right to file a civil rights 
claim in federal court if the prisoner believes that his or her civil 
rights have been violated. There are thousands of these cases filed 
every year.10 “Congress enacted the PLRA in 1996 with the intent that 
it would ‘reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner 
suits.’”11 The PLRA, in an effort to judicially screen prisoner 
complaints, requires prisoners to exhaust prison grievance procedures 
before filing suit in federal court.12 Thus, under the PLRA, prisoners 
must adhere to strict jurisdictional requirements in order to 
effectively file a suit.13 
III.  FACTS 
The petitioners were all inmates in the custody of the Michigan 
Department of Corrections (MDOC).14 The instructions for filing a 
grievance in the MDOC were as follows: 
Inmates must first attempt to resolve a problem orally within two 
business days of becoming aware of the grievable issue. If oral 
resolution is unsuccessful, the inmate may proceed to Step I of the 
grievance process, and submit a completed grievance form within five 
business days of the attempted oral resolution. The Step I grievance 
form provided by MDOC (a one-page form on which the inmate fills 
out identifying information and is given space to describe the 
complaint) advises inmates to be ‘brief and concise in describing your 
grievance issue.’ The inmate submits the grievance to a designated 
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grievance coordinator, who assigns it to a respondent-generally the 
supervisor of the person being grieved.15 
If the inmate is dissatisfied with the Step I response, he may 
appeal to Step II by obtaining an appeal form within five business 
days of the response, and submitting the appeal within five business 
days of obtaining the form. The respondent at Step II is designated by 
the policy, (e.g., the regional health administrator for medical care 
grievances). If still dissatisfied after Step II, the inmate may further 
appeal to Step III using the same appeal form; the MDOC director is 
designated as respondent for all Step III appeals.16 
In November 2000, Lorenzo Jones, an inmate, sustained injuries to 
his neck and back during a vehicle accident. 17 Several months later 
Jones was given a work assignment that he claimed he could not 
perform due to his injuries.18 Jones informed the staff member that he 
could not work, but was allegedly told to do the work or “suffer the 
consequences.”19 Subsequently, Jones performed the task and 
allegedly aggravated his injuries.20 After unsuccessfully seeking 
redress via the MDOC’s grievance process, Jones filed a complaint in 
the Eastern District of Michigan against six individuals: the staff 
worker that forced him to work, the staff worker in charge of work 
assignments, the warden, a deputy warden, a registered nurse, and a 
physician. 21 
A magistrate recommended the dismissal of all claims for the 
failure to state a claim with respect to all individuals except the staff 
worker who forced Jones to work and the staff worker in charge of 
work assignments.22 The District Court, however, held that there 
should be a dismissal of claims against all of the parties.23 Jones’s 
complaint provided the dates on which his claims were filed at various 
steps of the MDOC grievance procedures; however, he did not attach 
copies of the grievance forms or adequately describe the 
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proceedings.24 Even though the respondents attached copies of all of 
Jones’s grievances to their own motion to dismiss, the District Court 
ruled that Jones’s failure to plead exhaustion in his complaint could 
not be cured.25 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision 
because “Jones failed to comply with the specific pleading 
requirements applied to PLRA suits” and because “even if Jones had 
shown that he exhausted the claims against Morrison [the staff 
member worker in charge of work assignments] and Opanasenko [the 
staff worker that forced Jones to work], dismissal was still required 
under the total exhaustion26 rule.”27 
In Williams v. Overton, prisoner Timothy Williams suffered from 
noninvoluting cavernous hemangiomas in his right arm, a condition 
that causes pain, immobility, and disfigurement of the limb.28 Williams 
filed a complaint claiming that the Department of Corrections 
prevented him from obtaining proper medical care for his medical 
condition.29 The Eastern District of Michigan Court held that Williams 
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he did not 
identify all of the respondents in his lawsuit during the grievance 
process.30 As a result, the District Court applied the total exhaustion 
rule and dismissed the entire suit, despite the plaintiff’s claim that he 
had properly exhausted the grievance procedures.31 The Sixth Circuit 
affirmed.32 
In Walton v. Bouchard, prisoner John Walton assaulted a guard 
and was sanctioned with an indefinite “upper slot” restriction.33 
Walton later found out that other prisoners with the same infraction 
were given only a three-month “upper slot” restriction.34 He filed a 
complaint claiming that this disparity was racially motivated.35 The 
Western District of Michigan Court dismissed this lawsuit because 
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Walton did not name all of the individuals he was currently filing a 
complaint against in his initial administrative grievance.36 “His claims 
against the other respondents were thus not properly exhausted, and 
the court dismissed the entire action under the total exhaustion 
rule.”37 The Sixth Circuit affirmed.38 It reiterated its requirement that a 
prisoner must file a grievance at Step I of the MDOC grievance 
process against the person he ultimately seeks to sue. 39 
IV.  DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court. 
The Court’s holding was three-fold: (1) under the PLRA, failure to 
exhaust is an affirmative defense and inmates are not required to 
plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints;40 (2) under the 
PLRA, compliance with prison grievance procedures is all that is 
required to “properly exhaust” a claim and failure to name an 
individual that is later sued, is not per se inadequate;41 (3) the PLRA 
does not require the dismissal of the entire complaint when some, but 
not all, of the claims in the complaint have been exhausted.42 The 
Court reversed and remanded all of the Sixth Circuit rulings. 
A. Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense. 
The Court noted that, under the PLRA, exhaustion was 
mandatory for a claim to be brought into court, but that the PLRA 
was silent on the issue of whether exhaustion must be pleaded by the 
plaintiff or is an affirmative defense.43 The usual practice under the 
Federal Rules is to regard exhaustion as an affirmative defense.44 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote that “[c]ourts should generally not depart 
from the usual practice under the Federal Rules on the basis of 
perceived policy concerns.”45 Therefore, the silence of the PLRA is 
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strong evidence that the usual practice should be followed.46 The Sixth 
Circuit view that prisoners are required to plead and demonstrate 
exhaustion in their complaints was a minority view and is considered 
by the Court outside the typical litigation framework.47 There was no 
justifiable reason for the Sixth Circuit to deviate from the usual 
procedural practice beyond the departures specified by the PLRA 
itself.48 The Court held that failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense 
and inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate 
exhaustion in their complaints.49 
There are two important policy reasons that support the Court’s 
decision that Chief Justice Roberts did not address. First, many 
prisoners who file complaints are filing pro se, thereby the courts treat 
their pleadings in a more liberal fashion by ignoring imperfections.50 
Furthermore, “[c]ourts recognize that prisoners are frequently 
uneducated, unsophisticated, and legally inexperienced.”51 Forcing 
prisoners to succumb to a heightened and highly technical pleading 
requirement by requiring them to show exhaustion would be 
considered an intolerant pleading standard.52 Such a requirement 
would cause prisoners who make even minor mistakes in the 
administrative grievance process and in their pleadings to have their 
complaints dismissed.53 From a public policy perspective, applying this 
heightened pleading requirement to prisoner complaints appears 
improper. 
Secondly, it is more proper to have the prison officials bear the 
burden of pleading administrative exhaustion because they have 
better access to the resources that such pleading requires.54 “Prison 
officials have lawyers and [have] greater access to the prison records 
than prisoners . . . . With their access to prison records, they are better 
equipped to provide the court with documentation and explanations 
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of administrative proceedings.”55 Moreover, because prison officials 
have control over the prison administrative procedures, they have the 
ability to make it difficult for prisoners to fulfill the exhaustion 
requirements,56 thereby precluding the prisoner from bringing a valid 
suit in court.57 
Overall, treating the exhaustion requirement as an affirmative 
defense, as opposed to an absolute bar, correctly balances between 
frivolous prisoner litigation and unduly burdensome pleading. 
B. Compliance with prison grievance procedures is all that is required 
to “properly exhaust” a claim. 
The Court went on to address what is needed to fulfill the 
“exhaustion” requirement of the PLRA. The Sixth Circuit judicially 
creates a rule that a claimant must specifically “name all of the 
defendants” in the first step of the grievance process to fulfill the 
“exhaustion” requirement of the PLRA. However, there is no textual 
basis in the PLRA for this requirement.58 “Nothing in the MDOC 
policy itself supports the conclusion that the grievance process [is] 
improperly invoked simply because an individual later named as a 
defendant [is] not named at the first step of the grievance process.”59 
The Court correctly held that the PLRA requirement of “proper 
exhaustion” is fulfilled by complete compliance with the prison 
grievance procedures.60 “The level of detail necessary in a grievance to 
comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system to system 
and claim to claim, but it is the prison’s requirements, and not the 
PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.”61 
C. The PLRA does not follow the total exhaustion rule. 
The final issue the Court addressed concerns the total exhaustion 
rule and what happens when a claimant failed to exhaust some, but 
not all, of the claims asserted in the complaint.62 PLRA section 1997 
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states “[n]o action shall be brought” unless administrative procedures 
are exhausted.63 The Court rejected the respondent’s statutory 
interpretation of PLRA Section 1997e(a), which asserted that if 
Congress intended courts to dismiss only unexhausted claims while 
retaining the balance of the lawsuit Congress would have used the 
word “claim” rather than “action.” The Court noted the statutory 
phrasing “no action shall be brought” is boilerplate language and that 
there were many instances where that same language was used, but 
that had not been thought to lead to the dismissal of an entire action 
where a single claim failed to meet the pertinent standards.64 The 
norm is that if a complaint contains both good and bad claims, the 
court would leave the bad claims and continue with the good ones.65 If 
Congress wanted to depart from this, it would have specifically made 
that clear in the PLRA.66 
The Court noted that there was no indication of a congressional 
departure in this instance.67 This is in line with the respondent’s policy 
argument that because the PLRA was created as a tool for early 
judicial screening and a way to reduce the burden of prisoner 
litigation on the courts, the total exhaustion rule would allow courts to 
promptly dismiss an action upon identifying an unexhausted claim.68 
The Court was not persuaded by this argument and noted that the use 
of the total exhaustion rule would push inmates towards filing various 
separate claims, to avoid the possibility of an unexhausted claim 
tainting the others.69 That would promote the opposite purpose of the 
PLRA.70 Therefore, the total exhaustion rule does not apply to the 
PLRA. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The purpose of the PLRA was to address the large number of 
prisoner complaints filed in the federal courts and to provide a 
practical screening mechanism to help filter out unwarranted claims.71 
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However, the Sixth Circuit seems to have used this law to exclude 
prisoner complaints on even the slightest and most minor of 
technicalities. By setting clear guidelines regarding what a prisoner 
must do to exhaust prison grievance procedures, this decision has 
helped to allay the confusion among circuits, among prisoners, and 
among attorneys. The lower courts can now be clear that: (1) failure to 
exhaust is an affirmative defense and inmates are not required to 
specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints;72 (2) 
compliance with prison grievance procedures is all that is required to 
“properly exhaust” a claim;73 and (3) the PLRA does not require the 
dismissal of the entire complaint, when some, but not all, of the claims 
in the complaint have been exhausted.74 
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